Friday, September 23, 2005

Paris and the Defence

For the past 25 hours I have been entirely released from the numerous academic commitments that have strangled and sapped my soul for the past 2 (and 18 of the last 19) years. Yesterday, at 10 a.m. GMT I began the defence of my thesis on the historical, political and intellectual determinants of Russian nationalism. It was supposed to last thirty minutes; instead, I was under the microscope for three times as long, defending my methodological choices and the focus of my examination from savage critiques. I was told that my paper did not focus on the idea of 'appartenance' or belonging to /membership in the nation (it was not meant to). That I did not touch upon the idea of race (I did, but minimized its importance). That the paper had nothing to do with the teaching from the program (guilty as charged), and that my analysis was too "Anglo-Saxon" (true again). I should have known better than to have a sociologist rather than that rare beast, the 'political scientist', as my thesis director.

I do admit that it was a very general paper and was written as such more for my own intellectual curiosity and personal edification than to be a focused work on a particular aspect of my topic. I also belatedly discovered that it was missing about thirty citations from my change from MLA format to footnotes. Anyway, it was a rough defence, but when I emerged, barely alive, from the unrelenting criticism of my methodology and myriad attacks on my choice of subject, I was awarded a 14 for my troubles, which is a mention bien, or Honors. Now the French grading system is pretty messed up. The maximum note possible is 20, though as the joke goes, on a good day God might get a 20. 19 is reserved for experts in the field when they are on a roll, 18 for vastly superior work from lesser mortals like PhD students and low level experts. 10 is passing and most students are happy with that; anything above 12 is considered very good. Anyway, this was good news since, after my disastrous time-management on my Politics of International Trade exam at LSE, my chances for honors there seem dim.

On the other hand, I turn 25 in 11 days and I am scared. turning 22 was pretty hard because, unlike all of the other previous years, nothing useful came from that transition: thus began the slippery slope towards receding hairlines, viagra, midlife crises, broken hips and senility. Now I'll officially be crossing the threshold to the (shudder) late twenties and it's sort of freaking me out. Anyway, I have to go watch Matlock. Peace.

Thursday, September 08, 2005

Introduction

(Note to non-French speakers: I have included a translation feature on this site which will allow you to translate from French to English. It's halfway down the sidebar after the Flickr pictures and before the links section. Incredibly, the translation [at least for the introduction] is pretty good).


Depuis la chute de l’Union soviétique, le nationalisme russe est un sujet qui a beaucoup captivé et inquiété les observateurs de la Russie. Chaque jour, semble-t-il, on voit des articles qui suggèrent la résurgence des sentiments virulents nationalistes. Pour la plupart, ces articles caractérisent le nationalisme comme une influence maléfique, la manifestation actuelle d’un caractère russe agressif et chauviniste qui a perduré pendant les ères tsariste et soviétique jusqu’à nos jours, prêt à menacer l’Europe et les pays de l’ex-URSS. La tâche de bien comprendre le nationalisme russe n’est pas facilitée par les commentaires essentialistes des historiens de la Russie, qui proclament que « les Russes s’inclinent instinctivement à l’expansion et à son corollaire, le militarisme. » Ce genre de commentaire laisse échapper des détails plus fins des mouvements nationalistes en Russie qui peuvent éclaircir les perceptions sur ce phénomène mal compris. Bien que des mouvements nationalistes extrémistes, comme celui de Vladimir Jirinovski, soient bien connus pour leur xénophobie et leur insistance sur la supériorité de la Russie, il existe aussi des mouvements modérés nationalistes invoquant une identité civique et universaliste très différente du stéréotype chauviniste. Ce sujet est donc difficile à classifier : le nationalisme chauviniste peut encore représenter une menace réelle pour la stabilité de l’Europe de l’Est et pour le monde entier, mais si la Russie veut connaître la stabilité et la prospérité – en fait, échapper à son « sort douloureux » - un nationalisme bénin jouera un rôle important dans cette aspiration.

L’étendue de la question du nationalisme russe est bien vaste. Maints courants nationalistes ont existé dans l’histoire de la Russie, du mouvement Panslave aux Centaines Noirs au début du 20è siècle, jusqu’au nationalisme invoqué par Staline pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Chacune de ces formes de nationalisme mériterait un livre consacré à l’étude en profondeur de ses déterminants : de son contexte historique, des idées qui l’ont suscité, et un travail sociologique sur chaque groupe. L’objet de ce mémoire est d’examiner le nationalisme russe de nos jours, et de synthétiser ces méthodes d’interrogation en un seul cadre harmonieux et multidisciplinaire. Ce cadre nous permettra d’examiner la façon dont les déterminants historiques, sociologiques, et philosophiques ont formé et modulé le développement du nationalisme russe actuel. Ce mémoire tâche donc d’éclaircir le phénomène qu’est le nationalisme russe en évoquant les divers champs d’étude qui l’ont affecté. Ce travail semble être une bonne base pour un examen plus détaillé et plus vaste du nationalisme russe.

En ce qui concerne la question générale du nationalisme, il nous faut faire un travail préparatoire sur les idées sociologiques et anthropologiques de la formation des nations et de la connaissance nationale. Dans le premier chapitre, nous discuterons donc des controverses primaires de la question du nationalisme. Nous allons d’abord définir le nationalisme comme « ethnonationalisme », c’est-à-dire la fidélité à l’« ethnos » ou à la nation à laquelle on appartient. Suivant l’exemple de Max Weber et de Walker Connor, nous allons définir la nation comme étant le plus grand groupe qui se croit uni par des caractéristiques communes. Comme nous allons voir dans l’ultime chapitre, certains groupes utilisent des critères largement ou exclusivement ethnique pour déterminer l’appartenance à la nation alors que d’autres utilisent des critères plus civiques pour la délimiter.

Après avoir défini nos termes, nous allons aborder le débat fondamental pour les spécialistes du nationalisme : quel âge ont les nations? Il existe deux camps primaires dans ce débat, les primordialistes, qui croient que les nations ont des racines bien antiques et les modernistes qui maintiennent que la nation est un produit de la modernité et qu’elle ne peut pas exister dans un contexte préindustriel. En rejetant la perspective primordialiste, nous accepterons d’ailleurs la position dite « néo primordialiste » d’Anthony D. Smith, qui fait une synthèse des positions des deux camps. Smith accepte l’histoire de la formation de la nation soutenue par les modernistes mais réclame la nécessité d’un noyau culturel commun, fondé sur des « mythes constitutifs », pour que la nation puisse vraiment se concrétiser. Selon la théorie de Smith, il serait plus difficile de forger une nation avec des Japonais et des Autrichiens et leurs mythologies très différentes plutôt qu’avec des Prussiens et des Hessois. Comme nous le verrons, le contenu des mythes de la Russie est au premier plan du discours actuel nationaliste russe. Nous aborderons, à la fin de ce chapitre, la théorie du « nation building », le processus par lequel l’état s’intègre avec la société.

Ayant, dans le premier chapitre, créé la base méthodologique de notre examen du nationalisme, le deuxième chapitre appliquera cette idée de « nation building » dans son contexte historique. Nous examinerons l’histoire de l’état russe, en commençant avec ses origines au Moyen-Âge, pour voir le développement de l’état centralisé russe. Nous soutiendrons la thèse que ce processus de « nation building » n’eut pas vraiment lieu en Russie, et que, par conséquent celle-ci n’a jamais été une entité tel qu’un « état nation » comme les autres grands pays d’Europe. Les intérêts de l’état ont toujours prévalu sur des tentatives de créer une nation, et ces deux sphères de vie n’ont jamais fusionné comme ce fut le cas dans les pays d’Europe. De plus, des siècles d’expansion territoriale ont créé un pays fortement multiethnique où la réalité de cette diversité exigea certaines concessions aux groupes ethniques pour la maintenance et le fonctionnement de l’empire qui sapèrent une conscience nationale pour les russes. La Russie est restée donc un état multiethnique sans cohésion nationale : l’identité politique des Russes était séparée de leur identité culturelle ou ethnique, et le grand clivage entre les nobles et la masse paysanne a exclu la formation d’une vraie conscience nationale.

Bien que les Tsars n’aient pas particulièrement essayé d’inculquer une cohésion entre la nation et le société, ils ont quand même essayé d’inculquer quelques mythes constitutifs. Le mythe le plus important, mythe qui résonne toujours dans le discours nationaliste, est l’idée de puissance militaire et territoriale de la Russie. À partir du règne de Pierre I, ces idées furent souvent exploitées pour solidifier la position de l’Empire.

Même s’il n’y avait pas vraiment de « nation building » en Russie, l’idée d’une nation russe a bien existé. Pendant les Guerres Napoléoniennes, les nobles, fortement enracinés dans les traditions importées d’Europe, commencèrent à abandonner le mode de vie de leurs ennemis, les Français, pour s’intéresser à la tradition russe. Leurs expériences lors de ces guerres, où ils assistèrent au courage et à l’humanité de la paysannerie, les ont convaincus de la vertu et de la valeur des serfs. Pour la première fois, ils se sont vus comme faisant partie d’une même nation avec les paysans, même si tous ne partageront pas ce sentiment jusqu’à la fin du siècle. Avec un nouveau patriotisme et une nouvelle fierté nationale, certains commencèrent à rejeter les conventions et la culture en Europe, importées par Pierre Le Grand, et un grand débat sur l’identité russe et le rôle de la Russie s’est ouvert.

Dans le troisième chapitre, nous aborderons ces questions identitaires posées par l’intelligentsia pendant cette époque de ferment social. En particulier, nous allons examiner la pensée des Slavophiles, un groupe qui exalta les particularités de la Russie et décria les caractéristiques de l’Europe et de l’Occident. Fortement influencé par la philosophie Romantique allemande, ce groupe croyait que chaque pays possède une âme particulière. Selon eux, l’âme jeune et dynamique de la Russie fut supérieure à celle des vieux pays d’Europe qui furent corrompus par le matérialisme et le rationalisme qui naquit au Siècle des Lumières. Ils soutenaient un retour aux traditions rurales et communautaires de la Russie médiévale et le désengagement de la politique en faveur d’un règne d’un Tsar qui assumerait le « fardeau » du pouvoir politique.

Bien que ce mouvement philosophique ait eu lieu il y a presque deux cents ans et ne dura que pendant vingt, il exerce toujours une influence prépondérante sur le discours nationaliste. Les idées slavophiles ont subsisté dans le langage et les systèmes culturels des mouvements nationalistes. Pour les nationalistes, leurs mythes constitutifs de la Russie ont été empruntés aux idées des Slavophiles. Dans le dernier chapitre, nous verrons que les thèmes prévalant dans le discours slavophile demeurent plus ou moins intacts même s’ils sont communiqués maintenant d’une manière différente.

Enfin, nous allons conclure notre analyse avec l’examen du nationalisme russe de nos jours. Parce que l’étendue de ce phénomène est plutôt vaste, et pour mieux organiser notre analyse, nous allons diviser le nationalisme russe en catégories accessibles. Cette division nous aidera aussi à voir les différentes façons dont des influences distinctes ont affecté chaque courant du nationalisme.

En premier lieu, il y a le nationalisme extrémiste des « Nationaux-patriotes », caractérisé par le militarisme et une xénophobie virulente, et qui est faussement considéré comme étant le « vrai » nationalisme russe. Le nationalisme « étatiste » vise à la création d’un état fort comme dans l’ère Tsariste, mais à la différence des « Nationaux-patriotes » ils adhérent largement à une conception civique de la nation. La troisième catégorie est celle des « Nativistes », d’ardents chrétiens qui prônent l’orthodoxie et la simplicité de la vie paysanne pour effectuer la régénération morale de la Russie. Enfin, il y a un groupe nationaliste occidentaliste, qui, contrairement aux autres groupes, ne réclame aucune particularité de la nation russe mais rejette le passé impérialiste et tâche de forger une nation entièrement civique.
Comme notre tâche dans ce mémoire est de bien explorer les déterminants du nationalisme russe, nous ne ferons pas de vraie analyse sur ce phénomène dans le contexte politique de nos jours. Néanmoins, nous finirons par quelques mots sur la manière dont notre analyse peut éclaircir l’étude du nationalisme russe actuel.

11:00 8 September 2005

I have completed my thesis for the University of Paris. Entitled, "La constitution du nationalisme russe: Ses constituants historiques, sociétaux et intellectuels" it is 107 pages of crap. Or at least I think so, hopefully the Jury will think that it is magnificent. Anyway, being that I have written next to nothing on the site this summer, I figured I might as well put something up for discussion, so, for those of you who feel like having a lark, take a gander at my efforts at being a French intellectual.

Tuesday, August 02, 2005

Dr. Oklahomatt, PhD

I recently received the good news from the soon to be Dr. OklahoMatt Star Austin that he was awarded a fellowship for his Ph.D in Economics at the University of Oregon.

In commemoration of this momentous happening, let us marvel at the similarities between my esteemed acquaintance and the Argentinian striker, Hernan Crespo, recently returned to Chelsea after a loan spell at Milan AC. May their performances be prodigious and their scoring prolific in their new environments.



And for those of you who aren't familiar with the phenomenon that is OklahoMatt, here is my Friendster testamonial, which sums him up pretty well:

Matt’s a subtle, multi-faceted guy.
With his Cro-Magnon mannerisms, the
big 80s hair, and his prominent
forehead/brow, the Encino Man
comparisons are ineitable. But then
when he starts breaking shit down
about complexity theory and gets
perfect scores in Economic Growth
classes without even studying, he
ceases to be Stoney and becomes
instead Brendan Frasier in “With
Honors.” At other times, while
skateboarding, pumping up at the gym,
or explaining to his adoring students
how he got “his nose broke”, he is
more in the monosyllabic, action-hero
frame of mind: enter Brendan Frasier
in the Mummy or George of the Jungle.
Sometimes, in heartfelt conversations
over warm cups of hot cocoa, Matt
demonstrates his vulnerable side which
seeks only to love and to be loved,
much like the Brendan Frasier of
Bedazzled.

Matthew Star Austin: a panoply of
contradictions; drooling on his shirt
while reading Steven Jay Gould since
1979.


Peace.

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Understatement of the Year

It is a widely known fact in these here isles that Americans are a bit puzzled at the English proclivity for understatement. If Joe Six-pack likes something a great deal it only seems normal for him to openly and effusively praise it. In general, this is not the case for the English, who will opt for something like "it's not bad" or "hmph, this Cuivée Dom Pérignon 1982 is pretty good," seemingly faint praise which aims--so I have been told--to express admiration without embarrassing the person being praised. For us unsubtle colonial folk, this confuses and flummoxes us, even if we can understand in the abstract why it is done.

Perusing the news this morning, I came across a prime example in the Telegraph. Actually, while it certainly demonstrates the tendency to understate, this statement is simultaneously head-smackingly obvious. Maybe I'm missing someting, but saying something that doesn't really need to be said and doing so in an intentionally subtle way just doesn't make much sense to me. Wifey, a life-long Brit, helped to put into context. According to her, the Telegraph is "like the Daily Mail but more urbane." Read : BNP-lovin' , anti-immigration, blame the ills of society on the negroes and the Packies, Fedward Hyde-esque rhetoric lite, packaged for the more discerning, rural, simpleton. In this light, it begins to make some sense. You can read this snippet below (and in keeping with my national character, I have highlighted the relevant part).

Two bomb suspects shared a flat
By Duncan Gardham
(Filed: 26/07/2005)

Muktar Said Ibrahim and Yasin Hassan Omar and two brothers lived in the flat raided by police yesterday in north London, a friend of the men told the Telegraph last night.

All had families who came from Eritrea and moved to Saudi Arabia before coming to this country when they were young, the friend said. Ibrahim, 27, was educated at a local secondary school, mixed easily with youths of his age and went clubbing in London, the friend claimed. Although he still regularly stayed at the flat, he had recently moved to Hackney, near where the bus bomb failed to go off. Police wish to speak to him in connection with Thursday's incident.



Tuesday, July 19, 2005

Microsoft Word thinks Anglophones are dumb

It's been a slow slog of late for me here in London: my thesis for the Univerity of Paris is going slowly, as I've been bogged down in the ins and outs of nationalist theory. Writing it in French doesn't make it any easier. In fact, I am facing something of a quandary, as I cannot tell if it is faster for me to actually write the damn thing in English and then translate it (which takes ages, at least for me) or struggle along in the old Français at a extremely reduced clip. I've stuck to principle, writing in French because I think that it will be useful for the defense in September, but it's quite a pain in the ass.

Anyway, as I was toodling away in Word, writing an extended footnote about the noted nationalism theorist Anthony D. Smith, I realised that as I typed in the name "Eric Hobsbawm" the French dictionary didn't pick up on 'Eric' but recognised the much more obscure surname, 'Hobsbawm.' This was something of a surprise: among the generally well-rounded and well-read, Eric Hobsbawm is known as one of the more mainstream Marxist historians, but he's by no means a bolshevik Bill Bryson: in essence, he is known by Marxists and people who have to endure with Marxist critiques of social phenomena. So, as I surprisedly fixed my gaze at the red squiggly line that failed to appear, I began to wonder if this, like the classic "I'd like to see Bill Gates dead" thesaurus trick, was some sort of Easter Egg-like goodie inputted by some proto-Communist Microsoft programmer with a predilection for proletarianism. I immediately set off to work, testing my theory with increasingly obscure names.

My first tries all passed the test: apparently Hobsbawm, Almodovar, Menger, Mishima, Mick Jagger and Boutros Boutros Ghali were important enough to include in the dictionary. The left-wing theory didn't really seem to hold: Himmler, Spengler and Maistre all went through, though surprisingly 'Hyde' did not. Then I began to wonder, looking down at the input language indicator, if the dictionary entries differed according to country. Now, a bit of differentiation might make sense: Chrétien, Camus, and others are common enough in French and relatively rare in English, so some simple differences there would be expected. However, my inquiry went deeper, to see if there was some underlying assumption made about each country and its MS Word users, to be found in the collection of recognised proper nouns. Indeed, there are some disturbing trends to be found. For want of time to elaborate this further, I will include a list of names that are recognised in certain languages, to show the massive difference.

Names recognised in French but not English (US or UK):
Almodovar, Hobsbawm (and he's English!), Engels, Mishima, Himmler, Maistre, Menger, Mises, Spengler, Hesse, Camus, Durkheim, Gramsci, Hallyday, and, oddly enough, Jagger.

Thus, it would seem that the French dictionary has a wider range of social thinkers (and a wider range of socialists) and authors, which would correspond to the general stereotype that the French are more cultured than their Anglophone counterparts. The sad thing is that they're not even just European social thinkers on their list: Yukio Mishima is there in French but not in Engligh. As for the names that only existed in English, it's a pretty sad lot, with only three examples:

1. Stallone
2. Cobain,
3. Some bonus points here: Koizumi (though the French are notorious for being arsey and spelling names their own way, i.e. Poutine)

I didn't really want to go any further to see if names like Paltrow and Affleck were the only distinctive features of the English dictionary (though I did, and Affleck is recognised though Paltrow is not.) Now, you could argue that this doesn't necessarily reflect any dispartiy in inquitisiveness or intelligence between the two nations, and I would agree with you, and this could very well be the doing of some uppity French programmer who thought a bit of culture was needed to differentiate from les cochons anglophones impéralistes de culture inepte basée sur les hamburgers et la mcdonaldisation des blah blah blah, but regardless, I'm still a bit startled. Anyway, a fun and fleeting thought, but it's back to Smith and the Ethnic Origins of Nations for me.

Friday, July 15, 2005

Google knows the score

Thursday, July 07, 2005

The mood on the street

I was recently speaking to my esteemed colleague, the future Dr. Matthew Star Austin, Esq. about the terrorist bombing here in London, and he turned my attention to the FoxNews website, which was an eyeopener to say the least. Matt informed me that Murdoch's media mouthpiece was sensationalising the whole event, with massive photos of the burned out bus at Tavistock Square and large declarations of condemnation and revenge by Blair and G8 leaders.


This, I think, is one of the most potent denunciations of FoxNews imaginable

It made me want to retch, but I have to say that to be honest, I'm actually a bit underwhelmed about the whole affair. As I was writing the first sentence, while it occurred to me to qualify the term 'terrorist bombing' with some word like 'horrific', I really couldn't be bothered. I have received a flood of emails and phone calls all day from concerned friends and family but I've not really had anything to say about the attacks, preferring instead to ask the callers how they were doing and how their day had been.

From my limited knowledge of medicine, I understand that people often experience a sort of post-traumatic shock which desensitises them to terrible events in their lives, but, limited though my medical comprehension may be, I cannot honestly give myself such a self-diagnosis. I was nowhere near the bombings (though had class still been in session, I might very well have been) and I didn't even know what was happening until hours after they occurred. No, I think a more accurate diagnosis would be that I am simply feeling blasé about the whole affair, a sentiment which, despite Fox's shrill cries to the contrary, I believe is shared by many other Britons here in the capitol with me.

Do not misunderstand me: I am appalled by the events and I am terribly sad for the families. I would like for the perpetrators of this crime to be brought to justice and for this whole protracted war on a means to an end to be over. I certainly have been affected by the events of the day, but from my experiences today I have witnessed a people who were calm, level-headed, well-organised, and who essentially handled the grim business they needed to conduct with the proverbial stiff upper-lip. The statement circulating on the internet claims that "the heroic mujahedeen carried out a blessed attack in London, and now Britain is burning with fear and terror, from north to south, east to west," but from what I can tell, people are more worried about getting from point a to point b than they are about being blown up by a suicide bomber. It's not just me being blasé about the whole affair: in the hundreds of people I have passed today, I can think of only one who seemed the least bit phased by what had occurred--a man on the bus who was resting his head on the seat in front of him--and he might have just been really tired or hung-over.

I've been thinking about this and I think that the people who carried out this attack probably chose the worst people to try to terrorise with bombs. First, the English don't openly display their emotions the way that Americans do, and this reserve, I believe, helps to keep themselves and the people around them level-headed. The strongest emotional statement I heard today came from David Davis, the eloquent Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, who calmly and coolly argued that respect for the dead, calm, and focused determination were going to make things right. I can't imagine the response had Bush made a statement like that in America, but I imagine the treatment he gets from the left would be recreated on a far greater scale by the armchair generals and jingoists that populate our fair land. Even the media coverage was understated: having lived here for a year now, I rarely use American news sources, but the difference between FoxNews or even CNN's coverage of the event was markedly different from that of the BBC or the Times of London. The boldfaced headlines and huge interactive picture galleries that filled the entire page on the American sites was countered by a sober graphic in the top left hand corner on both the Beeb and the Times pages. Check out the difference yourself if too much time hasn't passed...

Continuing on, the second reason is that, probably owing to the perpetually pissing precipitation here in Old Blighty, the English always end up looking at the bright side of things. I cannot count how many times I have heard, "Well, it could have been so much worse," or "I can't imagine how many people could have died considering what they did." A few minutes ago I heard the first hints of humor when a man wondered aloud to his companion "now how are we going to get to work tomorrow?" The closest thing to humor on 9/11/2001 was that everybody at the bar I went to thought that playing 'Rock the Casbah' was riotously amusing and politically apt. But the English that I witnessed today seemed really no different than they did before: laughing, flirting, chatting and other such carefree activities were just as much in evidence as yesterday. It's clear that the English talent for putting a brave face on things makes them particularly unsuitable as a target for terror bombing. I mean, come on, these were the people who went through the Blitz and then got up and kept fighting! On top of it all, they've had to deal with this kind of thing for decades with the IRA, which has only increased their readiness and, unfortunately, their experience with losses to terror groups. I don't think I have ever been so impressed with the English as I have been today, and I can't help but think that my own calm reflection about the bombings have been altered by living amongst this remarkable people for the past 11 months.


Postscriptum: Perhaps I have gone too far. Just a moment ago the sirens from emergency vehicles (a perfectly normal occurrence here in Hackney) rang outside the internet cafe, and a few worried heads turned and furtively looked out the window. Oh well, at least I'm not scared.